International
oi-PTI
The
leaders
of
Russia
and
China
are
skipping
the
G20
summit,
but
their
absence
–
and
rifts
over
the
Ukraine
war
–
will
have
a
big
influence
on
the
proceedings.
Russian
President
Vladimir
Putin
won’t
be
at
the
G20
Leaders’ Summit,
but
he
and
the
Russia-Ukraine
war
are
likely
to
have
a
bigger
effect
on
outcomes
than
even
the
lack
of
Chinese
President
Xi
Jinping.
Days
before
world
leaders
prepared
to
gather
in
New
Delhi
for
the
summit
September
9-10,
news
emerged
that
China’s
leader
had
decided
not
to
attend.
Xi’s
absence
will
undoubtedly
stifle
progress
on
the
many
issues
plaguing
the
global
economy.
However,
it’s
Putin
and
the
war
in
Ukraine
that
is
likely
to
dominate
proceedings
and
hamper
progress
on
urgent
matters
before
the
G20.
President
Vladimir
Putin
With
Russia
a
member,
this
is
not
surprising.
But
the
G20’s
make-up
–
consisting
of
Western
states
and
leading
nations
from
the
Global
South
–
has
made
it
even
more
difficult
for
the
organisation
to
function
effectively.
The
G20
is
much
more
than
just
an
annual
two-day
Leaders’ Summit.
Most
of
its
work
happens
in
the
background,
through
networks
of
technocrats
and
policymakers,
who
can
find
ways
to
resolve
problems,
even
when
relations
between
their
leaders
deteriorate.
Beside
the
issue
of
an
ongoing
conflict,
the
‘in’
tray
is
full
this
year.
Global
inflation
remains
high,
and
growth
is
slowing
and
below
historical
trends.
G20
Summit:
In
Which
Hotel
Are
Biden,
Sunak,
Trudeau
Going
To
Stay
In
Delhi?
China
is
experiencing
its
own
economic
challenges
of
slowing
growth,
deflation
and
a
housing
market
crisis,
which
could
have
significant
knock-on
effects
for
the
rest
of
the
world.
Many
economies
are
struggling
with
debt.
Nearly
half
of
the
world’s
developing
countries
need
urgent
financial
assistance
as
the
financial
consequences
of
the
pandemic
have
finally
caught
up
with
them.
All
this
is
before
considering
long-term
issues
like
climate
change
or
sustainable
development.
Progress
on
both
fronts
is
falling
further
behind
schedule.
But
this
is
exactly
why
the
G20
was
created.
It
brings
together
the
world’s
20
largest
economies,
which
account
for
85
per
cent
of
global
GDP,
75
per
cent
of
global
trade
and
two-thirds
of
the
world’s
population.
To
the
extent
that
the
world
has
a
government,
the
G20
is
it.
Struggle
for
consensus
On
the
issue
of
Russia
and
Ukraine,
there
are
three
distinct
factions
within
the
G20.
There
is
Russia,
which
has
rejected
the
validity
of
discussing
the
war
at
the
G20,
arguing
that
as
an
economic
body
it
has
no
business
considering
security
matters.
Increasingly,
as
the
war
has
dragged
on,
this
has
been
China’s
position,
too,
as
it
draws
closer
to
Russia.
Then
there
are
the
Western
states,
which
initially
pushed
for
the
G20
to
expel
Russia
–
something
for
which
there
is
no
provision
–
and,
failing
that,
have
insisted
that
it
condemns
Russia
and
the
invasion
in
the
strongest
terms.
Finally,
there
is
the
majority
of
the
membership
from
the
Global
South,
which
has
tried
to
stay
neutral
in
the
conflict.
They
are
more
concerned
about
the
war’s
consequences,
including
its
effect
on
food
and
energy
prices,
which
particularly
affect
developing
economies.
With
such
divisions,
the
G20
has
struggled
to
reach
consensus.
None
of
the
ministerial-level
meetings
hosted
by
this
year’s
chair
India
have
ended
with
the
usual
communique
that
summarises
the
consensus
of
the
group
on
the
topics
discussed.
Instead,
India
has
issued
‘chair’s
summary
and
outcome’ documents
that
merely
summarise
discussions
and
note
the
disagreements.
Ahead
of
the
New
Delhi
summit,
diplomats
are
again
scrambling
to
devise
a
form
of
wording
for
the
final
communique
that
would
be
accepted
by
all
parties,
facing
the
possibility
of
failing
to
do
so
for
the
first
time
in
G20
history.
G20
Summit:
Bulletproof
‘Beast’
And
Three-Layer
Security
Measures
in
Place
For
US
Prez
Biden
Signs
of
progress
Despite
these
disagreements,
the
G20
has
managed
to
make
progress
on
some
issues.
G20
meetings
have
been
one
of
the
main
forums
through
which
reform
of
the
Multilateral
Development
Banks
has
been
discussed.
The
proposals
include
reforming
the
internal
policies
of
the
World
Bank
and
other
development
banks
to
allow
them
to
borrow
more
capital
and
lend
it
at
concessional
rates
–
especially
for
climate
projects
–
as
well
as
increases
of
funding
from
leading
states.
The
US
recently
promised
to
increase
its
contributions
by
USD
50
billion,
calling
on
its
allies
to
do
likewise
to
increase
the
total
to
USD
200
billion.
Campaigners
have
called
for
the
reforms
to
go
further,
but
they
still
offer
the
prospect
of
a
significant
increase
to
development
bank
funds.
The
focus
on
climate
financing
also
reflects
the
growing
importance
of
the
issue
in
developing
economies.
While
reforms
won’t
be
finalised
at
the
summit,
the
G20
has
proved
itself
a
useful
forum
to
maintain
and
progress
negotiations.
Another
G20
initiative
has
been
the
Common
Framework
for
Debt
Treatments,
agreed
in
2020,
which
is
the
first
multilateral
mechanism
for
forgiving
and
restructuring
the
sovereign
debt
of
low-income
countries.
The
Common
Framework
is
notable
for
involving
both
the
traditional
lenders
from
the
Paris
Club
and
new
ones
like
China.
It
has
already
allowed
Zambia
to
restructure
USD
6.3
billion
of
its
debt,
a
large
part
of
which
is
owed
to
China.
While
the
framework
has
shortcomings
–
for
one,
it
doesn’t
include
private
creditors
–
it
does
at
least
represent
a
lifeline
to
many
developing
economies
on
the
verge
of
defaulting
on
their
debts.
G20
Summit
In
Delhi:
Who
Will
Attend,
Who
Has
Opted
Out?
The
framework’s
continuation
illustrates
that
the
G20
functions,
even
in
the
face
of
very
public
disagreements.
This
persistence
can
be
explained
by
more
than
just
the
technocrats
working
and
cooperating
behind
the
scenes.
Over
the
past
two
years,
the
G20
has
been
chaired
by
developing
economies:
Indonesia
and
India.
Because
of
their
neutrality,
these
countries
have
greater
credibility
when
they
try
to
manage
the
stand-off
between
the
West
and
Russia,
so
the
G20
can
function
in
some
way.
With
the
next
two
hosts,
South
Africa
and
Brazil,
sharing
a
similar
inclination,
the
G20
might
continue
to
function,
even
if
the
thornier
global
problems
prove
beyond
its
capacity
to
address.
In
an
era
of
fragmenting
global
governance,
that
might
be
the
best
that
can
be
achieved.
