There are six members in the CMC, or at least only five now, if these reports are accurate. The significance of this is that He is the first uniformed CMC vice-chair to be removed since 1967. His dismissal – likely for corruption but with no official explanation given yet – thus represents the most dramatic purge of the PLA since Xi took over the reins of power.
Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the US-based Center for China Analysis, said these apparent actions by Xi are a “sign of a major trust and corruption problem within the PLA”. Morris continued, “This is by far the largest shake-up of PLA leadership and state-owned enterprises involved in military procurement in recent memory. It suggests deep anxiety and dysfunction within the ranks of China’s military, and a failure of trust between Xi and the military.”
Since Xi assumed the top post in China, at least 78 senior PLA officers – those of at least two-star rank – have been removed. This figure includes eight former or serving members of the CMC, illustrating how no post is immune from Xi’s far-reaching campaign to oust the disloyal and greedy. The most senior figure to fall prior to He was the CMC’s Admiral Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department, who was removed six months ago for “serious violations of discipline”, a typical euphemism for corruption.
In fact, Miao and He enjoy close ties, with their careers overlapping multiple times.
For example, they both served in the then 31st Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian. This is the province where Xi cut his teeth first as deputy secretary and then as governor, and where He was in charge of army troops at the time. As Morris explained, this made He and Miao comrades in arms, as well as close confidants within Xi’s inner circle.During the late 1990s and early 2000s, He and Xi became close allies. They overlapped in Fujian Province in the late 1990s, and Morris noted, too, “It is also believed that when Xi was party secretary of Zhejiang, He was stationed in Huzhou,and Xi reportedly visited He and his army corps more than a dozen times.”
By dismissing He, it becomes evident that Xi made an earlier mistake in rapidly elevating him. As Morris noted, “He Weidong was a surprise pick as second vice-chairman of the CMC. General He has been a career army officer and has been on an accelerated promotion track since Xi came to power. While he has deep operational experience, he has never served on the CMC or in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, his rise through the ranks and into the second vice-chair seat is rather remarkable, and he was on a fast track to become one of Xi’s most trusted military advisors.”
After joining the PLA in December 1972, his service included a stint as commander of ground forces in the Western Theater Command from May 2016. This command’s allotted territory includes the disputed border with India. He was promoted to lead the Eastern Theater Command in 2019, this being the primary theater charged with contingency operations against Taiwan and in the East China Sea. He remained in that post till January 2022.
Morris made some observations regarding the significance of He’s removal. “First, given his background in the Eastern Theater Command, He likely was one of Xi’s most important advisors on a Taiwan contingency. One has to wonder what impact, if any, his removal will have on the PLA’s Taiwan planning. It may or may not have an impact; it’s hard to say.”
The American academic continued: “Second, Xi appears to be targeting the Fujian ‘clique’, with Miao Hua and He Weidong both having moved up the ranks in the 31st Group Army.
There may indeed be a targeted purge taking place of PLA officers having overlapped with Xi in the 31st (now the 73rd) Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, and possibly the Eastern Theater Command. One wonders if this will have an impact
on Eastern Theater Command contingency planning for a Taiwan scenario.”
Lieutenant General Tang Yong, who also served in the currently labeled Eastern Theater Command from the 1990s to the 2000s, was removed last month. He was Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, and had actually been appointed by He. Again, Tang’s and Miao’s connection with the Eastern Theater Command may suggest that something of a “He Weidong” faction had been building. He has regularly used the phrase “CMC chairperson responsibility system,” which alludes to Xi’s complete control over the PLA. This is important because it showed He was paying extensive lip service to Xi’s authority. It is also notable that He’s apparent investigation is cloaked in secrecy, especially in comparison to former defense minister Li Shangfu’s case. Part of that investigation occurred publicly, with a call for public leads.
He has not been seen since the CCP’s high-profile Two Sessions gathering in Beijing from 5-11 March, and reports of He’s disappearance began circulating just a couple of days later. The general has been absent from events a CMC vice-chair would normally attend, intensifying speculation about his plight. One was a Politburo-level Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries on 8-9 April, which fellow CMC vice-chair Zhang Youxia did attend. While it is possible that He is sick, the shroud of silence from the CCP suggests otherwise.
K. Tristan Tang, writing for the US-based Jamestown Foundation, pointed out: “He Weidong’s current situation remains unknown. However, the hypothesis that Xi Jinping lost trust in He and has placed him under investigation is plausible. It also fits with a broader but related phenomenon, namely Xi’s low level of confidence in his senior military officers, as evidenced by his willingness to pay attention to the opinions of lower-ranking officers during his participation in the PLA delegation at the Two Sessions, a departure from his previous focus on high-ranking officials. This, in turn, is related to Xi’s growing paranoia beyond the military system.”
Xi is so intent on purging the PLA and wiping out cliques, because the military organisation is the armed wing of the CCP. It is the force that ensures and backs up party rule and its absolute supremacy in China. When domestic tensions rise – such as the current economic slowdown, trade tensions and global uncertainty, it becomes ever more imperative that the PLA guarantee and support CCP rule. As Xi said last year, echoing Mao Zedong, “The barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party.”
It is somewhat ironic that so many top PLA luminaries are being charged with corruption, when it is highly likely that Xi himself holds millions in assets. The US intelligence community assesses that Xi owns USD1 billion in hidden wealth through family members such as siblings, nephews and nieces, according to a report published by the US Director of National Intelligence in March 2025. This document estimated that as many as 65 per cent of all government officials in China receive unofficial income through bribery and graft. Despite Xi prosecuting 5 million CCP officials already, this is pretty depressing news for Xi’s anti-graft campaign!
The report said, “Industry research provides evidence that, as of 2024, Xi’s family retains millions in business interests and financial investments.” A Chinese Embassy official was known to have unsuccessfully lobbied Congress to have the report killed.
The US report confirms data contained in the leaked Panama Papers in 2016, which claimed leading Chinese government families had hidden obscene amounts of money in offshore companies. Of course, the CCP does not require officials to publicly disclose their assets, for that would be too embarrassing.
The unclassified Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party report stated, “Corruption is an endemic feature of and challenge for China, enabled by a political system with power highly centralized in the hands of the CCP, a CCP-centric concept of the rule of law, a lack of independent checks on public officials, and limited transparency.” While Xi’s anti-graft campaign has had less than stellar results in stamping out corruption, it has brought him tremendous political benefit by weeding out opponents. Indeed, the pogrom is as much about imposing political discipline and ideological purity as it is in eliminating financial crime.
Other recent defense establishment figures to face the chopping block for corruption charges are the two Chinese defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, as well as the top two commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, which is in charge of China’s nuclear missile arsenal. There were rumors last year that current Defense Minister Dong Jun was under investigation for similar crimes. However, it appears he was subsequently cleared, for he was seen recently meeting the chief of the Pakistan Air Force.
Tang of The Jamestown Foundation think-tank claimed, “A loss of trust in He Weidong’s ability to manage the PLA generals is the primary reason Xi may have removed him. He Weidong’s responsibilities likely include managing political affairs and discipline. However, under his management, the number of PLA generals being investigated or removed for disciplinary violations or otherwise breaking the law since the 20th Party Congress has been high – even after a decade-long anti-corruption campaign within the PLA. Many of the affected generals had been promoted to key positions during He’s tenure, raising concerns about the personnel management and promotion system he oversaw.”
Tang also remarked: “He Weidong’s likely downfall poses a deeper personnel problem for Xi, however. Within the PLA, only Zhang Youxia shares He Weidong’s rank; Miao Hua is under investigation; and Zhang Shengmin does not hold a Central Committee position. No one else would likely have the sufficient rank and experience to take on He’s role and manage PLA personnel effectively.” It will therefore be interesting to see how Xi fills his shoes.
Despite all these internal problems, China continues to look outward in terms of defense. Ukraine has captured two Chinese nationals fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, although it believes approximately 155 Chinese men are participating in the war. While no firm evidence has yet emerged that the Chinese government is deliberately funneling soldiers to Ukraine, this development is alarming.
Indeed, Russia is actively recruiting with Chinese-language promotional videos, for example, offering monthly pay of USD2,400 plus a sign-up bonus.
Tammy Bruce, US State Department spokesperson, told media on 8 April: “China is a major enabler of Russia in the war in Ukraine. China provides nearly 80 per cent of the dual-use items Russia needs to sustain the war. Eighty percent comes from China. As President Trump has said, continued cooperation between these two nuclear powers will only further contribute to global instability and make the United States and other countries less safe, less secure and less prosperous.”
